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Abstract. The games of prediction with expert advice are considered
in this paper. We present some modification of Kalai and Vempala al-
gorithm of following the perturbed leader for the case of unrestrictedly
large one-step gains. We show that in general case the cumulative gain
of any probabilistic prediction algorithm can be much worse than the
gain of some expert of the pool. Nevertheless, we give the lower bound
for this cumulative gain in general case and construct a universal algo-
rithm which has the optimal performance; we also prove that in case
when one-step gains of experts of the pool have “limited deviations” the
performance of our algorithm is close to the performance of the best
expert.
1 Introduction
Experts algorithms are used for online prediction or repeated decision making or
repeated game playing. Any such algorithm is based on a “pool of experts”. At
any step t, each expert gives its recommendation. From this, a “master decision”
is performed. After that, losses (or rewards) sit are assigned to each expert i =
1, . . . ,m by the environment (or adversary). The master algorithm also receives
some loss or reward depending on the master decision. The goal of the master
algorithm is to perform almost as well as the best expert in hindsight in the long
run.
Prediction with Expert Advice considered in this paper proceeds as follows.
We are asked to perform sequential actions at times t = 1, 2, . . . , T . At each
time step t, we observe results of actions of experts in the form of their gains
and losses on steps < t. After that, at the beginning of the step t Learner makes
a decision to follow one of these experts, say Expert i. At the end of step t
Learner receives the same gain or loss as Expert i at step t.
We use notations and definitions from [5] and [7]. Let si1:t = s
i
1 + . . . + s
i
t
be the cumulative loss of Expert i at time t. Given si1:t−1, i = 1, . . . ,m, at
time t, a natural idea to solve the expert problem is “to follow the leader”, i.e.
to select the expert i which performed best in the past. The following simple
example from Kalai and Vempala [7] shows that Learner can perform much worse
than each expert: let the current losses of two experts on steps t = 1, . . . , 6 be
s11,2,3,4,5,6 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) and s
2
1,2,3,4,5,6 = (
1
2 , 0, 1, 0, 1, 0). The “Follow Leader”
algorithm always chooses the wrong prediction.
The method of following the perturbed leader was discovered by Hannan [4].
Kalai and Vempala [7] rediscovered this method and published a simple proof
of the main result of Hannan. They called the algorithm of this type FPL (Fol-
lowing the Perturbed Leader). Hutter and Poland [5] presented a further devel-
opments of the FPL algorithm for countable class of experts, arbitrary weights
and adaptive learning rate.
The FPL algorithm outputs prediction of an expert i which minimizes
si1:t−1 −
1
ǫ
ξit,
where ξit , i = 1, . . .m, t = 1, 2, . . ., is a sequence of i.i.d random variables dis-
tributed according to the exponential distribution with the density p(t) = e−t,
and ǫ is a learning rate. Kalai and Vempala [7] show that the expected cumulative
loss of the FPL algorithm has the upper bound
E(s1:t) ≤ (1 + ǫ) min
i=1,...,n
si1:t +
log n
ǫ
,
where ǫ is a learning rate, n is the number of experts..
In the papers cited above the loss of each expert i can change at any step
t by a bounded quantity, for example, 0 ≤ sit ≤ 1 for all t. Poland and Hut-
ter [6] extended this analysis for games with one-step losses upper bounded by
an increasing sequence Bt given in advance, i.e., st ≤ Bt for all t. Allenberg et
al. [1] also considered unbounded losses, but with different algorithm than in
this paper.
In games considered in this paper the players will incur gains (loss is a neg-
ative gain); sit denotes one-step gain of a player i. For practical purposes, the
property 0 ≤ sit ≤ 1 seems to be too restrictive.
In Appendix A we consider some applications of results of Sections 2-4 of
this paper. We define two financial experts learning the fractional Brownian
motion whose one-step gains at any step can not be restricted in advance. This
application is at the bottom of our special interest in zero-sum games with
unbounded gains in Section 4.
In this paper we present some modification of Kalai and Vempala algorithm
for the case of unrestrictedly large one-step gains not bounded in advance. We
show that in general case, the cumulative gain of any probabilistic prediction
algorithm can be much worse than the gain of some expert of the pool. Neverthe-
less, we give the lower bound for cumulative gain of any probabilistic algorithm
in general case and prove that our universal algorithm has optimal performance;
we also prove that in case when one-step gains of experts of the pool have “lim-
ited deviations” (in particular, when they are bounded) the performance of our
algorithm is close to the performance of the best expert. This result is some
improvement of results mentioned above.
2 Learning in games of two experts with unbounded
gains
In this section we give some preliminary results presenting the bounds on the
performance of the algorithm constructed in Section 3.
We consider a simple game G of prediction with expert advice by following
of two experts with unbounded one-step gains. The goal of the master algorithm
is to receive a cumulative gain not much worse than the gain of the best expert
in hindsight.
At each step t of the game both experts receive the nonnegative one-step gains
s1t and s
2
t , and their cumulative gains after step t are equal to s
1
1:t = s
1
1:t−1 + s
1
t
and s21:t = s
2
1:t−1 + s
2
t .
For simplicity, we consider a variant when at each step t of the game G
only one expert can receive a nonnegative one-step gain st, and the total gain
of the other expert is unchanged, i.e., s11:t = s
1
1:t−1 + st and s
2
1:t = s
2
1:t−1 or
s21:t = s
2
1:t−1 + st and s
1
1:t = s
1
1:t−1. In the general case the analysis is similar.
We also consider non-degenerate experts (games), i.e., such that
max{s11:t, s
2
1:t} → ∞ as t→∞.
A probabilistic algorithm of following the leader in the game with two experts
is based on a computable function f which given cumulative gains s11:t−1 and
s21:t−1 of the experts in hindside outputs the probability of following the first
expert P{I = 1} = f(s11:t−1, s
2
1:t−1) and the probability of following the second
expert P{I = 2} = 1− P{I = 1}.
The analysis in case when these probabilities depend of the whole history of
gains is similar.
Let two experts be given. The master algorithm works as follows.
Probabilistic algorithm of following the leader.
FOR t = 1, . . . T
Given past cumulative gains of the experts s11:t−1 and s
2
1:t−1 choose the expert
i ∈ {1, 2} with probability P{I = i}.
Receive the one-step gains at step t of two experts s1t and s
2
t and define one
step gain st = s
i
t of the master algorithm.
ENDFOR
The following theorem says that if a probabilistic algorithm of following the
leader has high performance in games with bounded one-step gains then its
performance in games with unbounded one-step gains can be much worse than
the performance of some experts.
Theorem 1. Let δ, δ′ be arbitrary close and arbitrary small positive real num-
bers such that δ′ > δ, and let for any two non-degenerate experts with bounded
one-step gains sit, i = 1, 2, i.e., such that 0 ≤ s
i
t ≤ 1 for all t, a master algorithm
has the expected cumulative gain
E(s1:t) ≥ (1− δ) max
i=1,2
si1:t (1)
for all sufficiently large t. Then there exist two experts with unbounded one-step
gains such that the expected cumulative gain of the master algorithm is bounded
from above
E(s1:t) ≤ δ
′ max
i=1,2
si1:t (2)
for infinitely many t.
Proof. Let a master algorithm be given, and let P{I = 1} = f(s1, s2) and
P{I = 2} = 1 − P{I = 1} be probabilities to choose the best expert from two
experts with cumulative gains s1, s2. The proof of the theorem uses the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. Let δ, δ′ be positive real numbers such that δ′ > δ and for any two
experts with bounded one-step gains the master algorithm has the expected per-
formance (1) for all sufficiently large t. Then for any two real numbers s˜1 and
s˜2 a number s1 exists such that s1 ≥ s˜1, s1 ≥ s˜2, and P{I = 1} ≥ 1− δ′, where
P{I = 1} = f(s1, s˜2) (and P{I = 2} = 1− P{I = 1}).
Proof. Suppose that for some pair s˜1, s˜2 of real numbers the contrary statement
holds. Then we can construct two experts with cumulative gains s11:t−1, s
2
1:t−1,
t = 1, 2, . . ., and with step-gains equal 0 or 1 such that (1) is violated.
Define the sequences s1t , s
2
t , t = 1, 2, . . . t0, such that s
1
t , s
2
t are equal to 0 or
1 and such that s11:t0 = s˜
1 and s21:t0 = s˜
2 for some t0. After that, define s
1
t = 1
and s2t = 0 for all t > t0. We have s
1
1:t−1 > s
2
1:t−1 and P{I = 1} < 1 − δ
′ for all
sufficiently large t. Then for the expected one-step gain of the master algorithm,
E(st) < 1 ◦ P{I = 1}+ 0 ◦ P{I = 2} ≤ 1− δ
′ = s1t (1− δ
′)
holds for all these t. Since s11:t → ∞ as t → ∞, we have E(s1:t) < (1 − δ)s
1
1:t
for all sufficiently large t. This is a contradiction with (1). Hence, for some t we
have s11:t−1 > s
2
1:t−1 and P{I = 1} ≥ 1− δ
′, where P{I = 1} = f(s11:t−1, s
2
1:t−1).
△
We define two experts with unbounded one-step gains as follows. Define s10 =
0 and s20 = 0. By Lemma 1 a number s
1 > 0 exists such that P{I = 1} ≥ 1− δ,
where P{I = 1} = f(s1, 0). Define s11 = s
1, s21 = 0.
Let t be even, and let s11:t−1 and s
2
1:t−1 be defined on previous steps. We
will use the induction hypothesis: s11:t−1 > s
2
1:t−1 and P{I = 1} ≥ 1 − δ. By
definition this induction hypothesis holds t = 2. Define one-step gains of experts
1 and 2 at step t: s1t = 0 and s
2
t = Mt, where Mt =
E(s1:t−1)
δ′−δ
and E(s1:t−1) is
the mathematical expectation of the cumulative gain of the master algorithm on
steps < t.
Let t be odd. By Lemma 1 a number s1 exists such that s1 ≥ s11:t−1, s
1 ≥
s21:t−1, and P{I = 1} ≥ 1 − δ, where P{I = 1} = f(s
1, s21:t−1). Define s
1
t =
s1−s11:t−1 and s
2
t = 0. Then s
1
1:t = s
1 and s21:t = s
2
1:t−1. Evidently, the induction
hypothesis is valid after step t.
Let us prove that this definition is correct. Let t be even. By the induc-
tion hypothesis s11:t−1 > s
2
1:t−1 and P{I = 1} ≥ 1 − δ, where P{I = 1} =
f(s11:t−1, s
2
1:t−1). Then P{I = 2} < δ. By definition s
1
1:t = s
1
1:t−1 and s
2
1:t =
s21:t−1 +Mt. Then we obtain an upper bound for the expected one-step gain of
the master algorithm
E(st) = s
1
tE{I = 1}+ s
2
tE{I = 2} ≤ δMt.
For expected cumulative gain, we have
E(s1:t) ≤ E(s1:t−1) + δMt ≤ δ
′(s21:t−1 +Mt) = δ
′s21:t. (3)
Inequality (3) holds for all even steps t. △
Decreasing the lower bound of the performance of a probabilistic algorithm
for games with bounded one-step gain functions we can increase it for games
with unbounded gain functions. The limit case is given by the following simple
example. Evidently, the expected cumulative gain of the probabilistic algorithm
which chooses one of two experts with equal probabilities 12 has the lower bound
E(s1:t) =
1
2
s11:t +
1
2
s21:t ≥
1
2
max
i=1,2
si1:t (4)
for i = 1, 2.
The following simple diagonal argument shows that the cumulative gain of
any probabilistic algorithm of following the leader can be bigger than this bound
for some experts, analogously, it can be smaller for some experts.
Proposition 1. For any δ such that 0 < δ < 1 and for any probabilistic al-
gorithm of following the best expert, two experts exist such that the expected
cumulative gain of this algorithm satisfies
E(s1:t) ≤
1
2
(1 + δ) max
i=1,2
si1:t, (5)
for all sufficiently large t, where s11:t, s
2
1:t are cumulative gains of these experts.
Analogously, two experts exist such that
E(s1:t) ≥
1
2
(1 − δ) max
i=1,2
si1:t (6)
for all sufficiently large t.
Proof. Given a probabilistic algorithm of following the best expert and δ such
that 0 < δ < 1 define recursively the gains of expert 1 and expert 2 at any step
t as follows. Let s11:t−1 and s
2
1:t−1 be cumulative gains of these experts incurred
at steps < t. Let Mt = E(s1:t−1)/δ, where E(s1:t−1) is the expected cumulative
gain of the master algorithm in the past.
If P{I = 1} > 12 then define s
1
t = 0 and s
2
t = Mt, and define s
1
t = Mt
and s2t = 0 otherwise. Then E(st) = s
1
tP{I = 1} + s
2
tP{I = 2} ≤
1
2Mt and
E(s1:t) = E(s
1
1:t−1) +E(st) ≤
1
2 (1 + δ)Mt ≤
1
2 (1 + δ) maxi=1,2
si1:t for all sufficiently
large t.
To prove (6) define s1t = Mt and s
2
t = 0 if P{I = 1} >
1
2 , and define s
1
t = 0
and s2t = Mt otherwise. The following derivation is analogous to the proof of
(5). △
3 Asymptotically optimal algorithm of following the
perturbed leader
In this section we show that the bounds (1) and (2) obtained in Theorem 1 can
be achieved by some probabilistic algorithm. More correctly, for any δ > 0 using
the method of following the perturbed leader we construct a universal algorithm
such that for any δ such that 0 < δ < 1 the lower bound
E(s1:t) ≥ (1− δ) max
i=1,2
si1:t
is valid for all sufficiently large t for arbitrary two experts (i = 1, 2) with bounded
one-step gain functions (and even in more general case), and, at the same time,
for some δ′ > 0 the bound
E(s1:t) ≥ δ
′ max
i=1,2
si1:t
is valid for all experts with arbitrary unbounded one-step gain functions. Here
E(s1:t) is the cumulative expected gain of the master algorithm.
Note that in this section the cumulative gain is always nonnegative si1:t ≥ 0
for all t and for i = 1, 2. In Section 4 we consider the case when the gains can
be negative, i.e., experts can incur losses. Recall that, for simplicity, we suppose
that at any step t only one expert can receive a positive one-step gain, i.e., s1t = 0
or s2t = 0. We denote st = max{s
1
t , s
2
t}.
Let ξ11 , ξ
2
1 , ξ
1
2 , ξ
2
2 , . . . be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables distributed ac-
cording to the exponential law with the density p(t) = e−t.
We consider the FPL algorithm with learning rate
ǫt−1 =
1
µmax{s11:t−1, s
2
1:t−1}
, (7)
where t = 1, 2, . . . and µ, where 0 < µ < 1, is a parameter of the algorithm.
We suppose without loss of generality that s10 = s
2
0 = 1. By definition the
sequence ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . is non-decreasing.
The FPL algorithm is defined as follows:
FPL algorithm.
FOR t = 1, . . . T
Output prediction of expert i = imax which maximizes
si1:t−1 +
1
ǫt−1
ξit , (8)
where i = 1, 2, ǫt−1 is defined by (7).
Receive one-step gains sit for experts i = 1, 2, and define one step gain s
imax
t
of the master algorithm.
ENDFOR
Recall that a gameG of two experts is called non-degenerate if vt = max{s
1
1:t, s
2
1:t} →
∞ as t → ∞, where si1:t is the cumulative gain of the expert i = 1, 2 at step t.
The number
Dev(G) = lim sup
t→∞
st
vt
, (9)
where st = max{s
1
t , s
2
t}, is called the deviation of the game G. For any game
Dev(G) ≤ 1 by definition. In any non-degenerate game G with bounded one-
step gain function, i.e. such that 0 ≤ st ≤ A for all t (A is a positive real
number), Dev(G) = 0.
Theorem 2. For any µ such that 0 < µ < 1 an FPL algorithm can be specified
such that for any non-degenerate game of two experts its expected cumulative
gain at any step T has the lower bound
l1:T ≥ e
− 2
µ (1− µ) max
i=1,2
si1:T , (10)
where si1:T is the cumulative gain of the expert i = 1, 2.
If Dev(G) ≤ 12µδ for some 0 < δ < 1 then
l1:T ≥ (1 − δ)(1− µ) max
i=1,2
si1:T (11)
holds for all sufficiently large T . 1
Proof. This theorem will follow from Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 below. In the
proof we follow the proof-scheme of [5] and [7]. △
The analysis of optimality of the FPL algorithm is based on an intermediate
predictor IFPL (Infeasible FPL) with the learning rate
ǫt =
1
µvt
, (12)
where vt = max{s
1
1:t, s
2
1:t}.
IFPL algorithm.
FOR t = 1, . . . T
Output prediction of expert i = imax with maximal value of
si1:t +
1
ǫt
ξit ,
where i = 1, 2, ǫt is defined by (12), and ξ
1
t , ξ
2
t are independent random variables
distributed according to the exponential distribution with the density p(t) = e−t.
1 The optimal value of µ for (10) is µ = 0.618. Then l1:T ≥ 0.015maxi=1,2 si1:T in (10)
and l1:T ≥ 0.382(1 − δ)maxi=1,2 si1:T in (11). Comparing these bounds with (4), we
reveal a large gap between bounds (10) and (11). Author does not know if we can
increase the lower bound (10) when µ ≈ 1
2
in (11).
Receive one-step gains sit for experts i = 1, 2, and define one step gain s
imax
t
of the master algorithm.
ENDFOR
The IFPL algorithm predicts under the knowledge of s11:t and s
2
1:t (ǫt is
their maximum), which both may not be available at beginning of step t. Using
unknown value of ǫt (like s
i
1:t, i = 1, 2) is the main peculiarity of our version of
IFPL.
To distinguish the gains of the FPL and IFPL algorithms we denote sIt a
one-step gain of the FPL algorithm at step t and sJt is a one-step gain of the
IFPL algorithm. The expected one-step gains of the FPL and IFPL algorithms
at the step t are denoted lt = Et(s
I
t ) and rt = Et(s
J
t ).
Theorem 3. For any µ, 0 < µ < 1, the expected one-step gain lt of the FPL
algorithm with learning rate (7) and the expected one-step gain rt of the IFPL
algorithm with learning rate (12) satisfy the inequalities
lt ≥ e
− 2
µ rt (13)
for all t.
If Dev(G) ≤ 12µδ for some 0 < δ < 1 then
lt ≥ (1− δ)rt (14)
holds for all sufficiently large t.
Proof. For any t > 0, denote ξ1 = ξ1t , ξ
2 = ξ2t and consider two random variables
I =
{
1 if s11:t−1 +
1
ǫt−1
ξ1 > s21:t−1 +
1
ǫt−1
ξ2
2 otherwise
and
J =
{
1 if s11:t +
1
ǫt
ξ1 > s21:t +
1
ǫt
ξ2
2 otherwise
Recall that vt = max{s
1
1:t, s
2
1:t} for all t. For any real number r we compare
conditional probabilities P{I = 1|ξ2 = r} with P{J = 1|ξ2 = r} and P{I =
2|ξ2 = r} with P{J = 2|ξ2 = r}.
In our analysis, the nontrivial cases are s21:t = s
2
1:t−1 + st and s
1
1:t = s
1
1:t−1
or s11:t = s
1
1:t−1 + st and s
2
1:t = s
2
1:t−1, where st > 0 (we indicate these cases in
(16)-(19) below by ±). In this case the following chain of equalities is valid:
P{I = 1|ξ2 = r} = P{s11:t−1 +
1
ǫt−1
ξ1 > s21:t−1 +
1
ǫt−1
r|ξ2 = r} =
P{ξ1 > ǫt−1(s
2
1:t−1 − s
1
1:t−1) + r|ξ
2 = r} =
P{ξ1 > ǫt(s
2
1:t−1 − s
1
1:t−1) + (ǫt−1 − ǫt)(s
2
1:t−1 − s
1
1:t−1) + r|ξ
2 = r} = (15)
e−(ǫt−1−ǫt)(s
2
1:t−1−s
1
1:t−1)P{ξ1 >
1
µvt
(s21:t−1 − s
1
1:t−1) + r|ξ
2 = r} = (16)
e
−
(
1
µvt−1
− 1
µvt
)
(s2
1:t−1−s
1
1:t−1)±
st
µvt
P{ξ1 >
1
µvt
(s21:t−1 ± st − s
1
1:t−1) + r|ξ
2 = r} = (17)
e
st
µvt
(
γt
s1
1:t−1
−s2
1:t−1
vt−1
±1
)
P{ξ1 >
1
µvt
(s21:t − s
1
1:t) + r|ξ
2 = r} = (18)
e
st
µvt
(
γt
s1
1:t−1
−s2
1:t−1
vt−1
±1
)
P{J = 1|ξ2 = r}. (19)
Here we have used twice, in (15)-(16) and in (16)-(17), the equality P{ξ >
a + b} = e−bP{ξ > a} for any random variable ξ distributed according to the
exponential law; we also used the equality vt − vt−1 = γtst, where 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1,
in (16). The exponent (19) is bounded
2 ≥ γt
s11:t−1 − s
2
1:t−1
vt−1
± 1 ≥ −2. (20)
These bounds follow from the inequalities si1:t−1/vt−1 ≤ 1 and s
i
1:t−1 ≥ 0 for all
t and for i = 1, 2. We also used the inequality st/vt ≤ 1 for all t. Therefore,
e
2
µP{J = 1|ξ2 = r} ≥ P{I = 1|ξ2 = r} ≥ e−
2
µP{J = 1|ξ2 = r}. (21)
Since, the the inequality (21) holds for all r, it also holds unconditionally
e
2
µP{J = 1} ≥ P{I = 1} ≥ e−
2
µP{J = 1}. (22)
Analogously, we obtain
e
2
µP{J = 2} ≥ P{I = 2} ≥ e−
2
µP{J = 2} (23)
for all t = 1, 2, . . ..
If Dev(G) ≤ 12µδ, when for sufficiently large t the exponent (19) is bounded
from below by
e−
2
µ
st
vt ≥ e−δ ≥ 1− δ.
From this (14) follows.
From (22) and (23) we obtain the lower bound (13)
lt = E(s
I
t ) = s
1
tP (I = 1) + s
2
tP (I = 2) ≥
s1t e
− 2
µP (J = 1) + s2t e
− 2
µP (J = 2) = e−
2
µE(sJ ) = e−
2
µ rt. (24)
△
The connection between expected cumulative gain of the IFPL algorithm
r1:T =
T∑
t=1
rt
and expected cumulative gain of the FPL algorithm
l1:T =
T∑
t=1
lt.
is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any µ and η, 0 < µ, η < 1, the expected cumulative gains of
the IFPL and FPL algorithms with parameters defined in Theorem 3 satisfy the
following inequalities
l1:T ≥ e
− 2
µ r1:T (25)
for all T .
If Dev(G) ≤ 12µδ for some 0 < δ < 1 then
l1:T ≥ (1− δ)r1:T
holds for all sufficiently large T .
The second bound also holds for unbounded one-step gain games and so, it is
some improvement of results of [7] and [5].
The following theorem, which is an analogue of the result from [7], gives a
bound for the IFPL algorithm
Theorem 4. The expected cumulative gain of the IFPL algorithm with the learn-
ing rate (12) is bounded by
r1:T ≥ max
i=1,2
si1:T −
1
ǫT
(26)
for all T .
The proof is along the line of the proof from [5] (which is a refinement of the
proof from [7]).
Let in this proof st = (s
1
t , s
2
t ) be a vector of one step gains and s1:t =
(s11:t, s
2
1:t) be a vector of cumulative gains of two experts, also let ξ be a vector
whose coordinates are random variables ξ1t and ξ
2
t . Define ǫ0 = ∞ and s˜1:t =
s1:t +
1
ǫt
ξt for t = 1, 2, . . .. Consider the one-step gains s˜t = st + ξt
(
1
ǫt
− 1
ǫt−1
)
for the moment. For any vector s and a unit vector d denote
M(s) = argmaxd∈D{d ◦ s},
where D = {(0, 1)T , (1, 0)T } is the set of two unit vectors of dimension 2 and ◦
is the inner product of two vectors.
We first show that
T∑
t=1
M(s˜1:t) ◦ s˜t ≥M(s˜1:T ) ◦ s˜1:T . (27)
For T = 1 this is obvious. For the induction step from T − 1 to T we need to
show that
M(s˜1:T ) ◦ s˜T ≥M(s˜1:T ) ◦ s˜1:T −M(s˜1:T−1) ◦ s˜1:T−1.
This follows from s˜1:T = s˜1:T−1+ s˜T and M(s˜1:T )◦ s˜1:T−1 ≤M(s˜1:T−1)◦ s˜1:T−1.
We rewrite (27) as follows
T∑
t=1
M(s˜1:t) ◦ st ≥M(s˜1:T ) ◦ s˜1:T −
T∑
t=1
M(s˜1:t) ◦ ξt
(
1
ǫt
−
1
ǫt−1
)
. (28)
By the definition of M we have
M(s˜1:T ) ◦ s˜1:T ≥M
(
s1:T +
1
ǫT
)
◦
(
s1:T +
ξ
ǫT
)
=
max
d
{d ◦ s1:T }+M
(
s1:T +
1
ǫT
)
◦
ξT
ǫT
. (29)
The expectation of the last term in (29) is equal to 1
ǫT
. We have also
T∑
t=1
(
1
ǫt
−
1
ǫt−1
)
M(s˜1:t) ◦ ξt ≤
T∑
t=1
(
1
ǫt
−
1
ǫt−1
)
M(ξt) ◦ ξt. (30)
We have P{max ξ > y} ≤ P{ξ1 > y}+ P{ξ2 > y} = 2e−y. Since
E(M(ξt) ◦ ξt) = E(max{ξ
1, ξ2}) ≤
∫ ∞
0
2e−ydy = 2,
the expectation of (30) has upper bound 2
ǫT
. Combining the bounds (28)-(30)
we obtain (26). △.
Corollary 2. Let µ, 0 < µ < 1, be given. If the game of two experts is non-
degenerative then the expected cumulative gain of the IFPL algorithm is bounded
by
r1:T ≥ max
i=1,2
si1:T (1− µ).
4 Zero sum games
We consider a simplest example of the game of prediction with expert advice
with arbitrary positive and negative one-step gains and losses. We apply these
results in Appendix A.
We consider a game G of two experts with zero sum, i.e., s1t = −s
2
t at each
step t of the game. If a one-step gain is negative it is called a loss. There are no
restrictions on the absolute values of s1t . Define a volume of the game at step t
Vt =
t∑
j=1
|s1j |.
A game with zero sum is called non-degenerate if lim
t→∞
Vt = ∞. Analogously to
(9) we consider the deviation of the game G with zero sum
Dev(G) = lim sup
t→∞
st
Vt
,
where st = |s
1
t | and Vt is the volume of the game.
Evidently, the expected cumulative gain of the algorithm which chooses one
of two experts with probability 12 equals zero.
The following proposition is an analogue of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For any probabilistic algorithm of following the best expert, two
experts exist such that the expected cumulative gain of this algorithm E(s1:t) ≤ 0
and two experts exist such that E(s1:t) ≥ 0 for all t.
Proof. If P{I = 1} > 12 define s
1
t = 1, s
2
t = −1 and define s
1
t = −1, s
2
t = 0
otherwise. The following estimates are analogous to that given in the proof of
Proposition 1. △
The following theorem which is an analogue of the Theorem 1 for games
with zero sum shows that if a probabilistic algorithm of the following the leader
has high performance in games with bounded one-step gains then its expected
cumulative gain in some games with unbounded one-step expert gains can be
arbitrary negative.
Theorem 5. Let Lt be any sequence of positive real numbers, t = 1, 2, . . .. Let
δ, δ′ be arbitrary close and arbitrary small positive real numbers such that δ > δ′,
and let for any two experts with bounded one-step gains st, i.e. such that 0 ≤
st ≤ 1 for all t, the expected cumulative gain of the master algorithm has the
lower bound
E(s1:t) ≥ (1− δ)|s
1
1:t| (31)
for all sufficiently large t. Then there exist two non-degenerate experts with un-
bounded one-step gains such that the expected performance of the master algo-
rithm is bounded from above
E(s1:t) ≤ 2δ
′|s11:t| − (1− 2δ
′)Vt (32)
and such that Vt ≥ Lt for infinitely many t, where Vt is the volume of the game.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. It uses a modified
version of Lemma 1 which is also valid for negative gains with some evident
modifications. 2
Let a master algorithm be given. We define two experts with unbounded
one-step gains as follows. Define s11 = s
2
1 = 0. By modified version of Lemma 1
a number s1 exists such that s1 > 0 and P{I = 1} ≥ 1− δ, where P{I = 1} =
f(s1,−s1).
Let t be even, and let s11:t−1 and s
2
1:t−1 = −s
1
1:t−1 be defined on previous
steps. We will use the induction hypothesis: s11:t−1 > 0 and P{I = 1} ≥ 1 − δ,
where P{I = 1} = f(s11:t−1, s
2
1:t−1).
Define one-step gains of experts 1 and 2: s1t = −Mt and s
2
t = Mt, where
Mt = max
{
|E(s1:t−1)|
2(δ − δ′)
, Lt,
Vt−1
δ
}
.
Let t be odd. By modified version of Lemma 1 a number s1 exists such
that s1 > |s11:t−1| and P{I = 1} ≥ 1 − δ, where P{I = 1} = f(s
1,−s1).
Define s1t = s
1 − s11:t−1, then s
1
1:t = s
1, and s2t = −s
1
t . Evidently, the induction
hypothesis is valid after odd step t.
Let us prove that this construction is correct. Let t be even. Then by the
induction hypothesis s11:t−1 > 0 and P{I = 1} ≥ 1 − δ (and P{I = 2} < δ). By
definition s11:t = s
1
1:t−1 −Mt and s
2
1:t = s
2
1:t−1 +Mt. The expected one-step gain
of the master algorithm is bounded
E(st) = s
1
tP{I = 1}+ s
2
tP{I = 2} ≤ −(1− δ)Mt + δMt = −(1− 2δ)Mt.
By definition Lt ≤Mt ≤ Vt = Vt−1 +Mt ≤ (1 + δ)Mt. Then
E(s1:t) ≤ E(s1:t−1)− (1 − 2δ)Mt ≤ −(1− 2δ
′)Mt =
−Mt + 2δ
′Mt ≤ −(1− δ)Vt + 2δ
′|s11:t|
for all even steps t. △
We consider the non-degenerate games, i.e., such that Vt is unbounded.
To obtain the lower bounds we reduce our zero sum game to a game with
non-negative one-step gains. Define one-step gain of new experts s˜it = s
i
t + |s
1
t |
for i = 1, 2. Then s˜it ≥ 0 for all t and s˜
1
t = 0 or s˜
2
t = 0 for all t. By definition
s˜i1:t = s
i
1:t+Vt for i = 1, 2, where Vt is the volume of the initial game. Evidently,
the FPL and IFPL algorithms defined in Section 3 make the same choices for
experts of both type.
The expected one-step gains of the master algorithm for for experts of both
type satisfy l˜t = s
1
tP{I = 1} + s
2
tP{I = 1} + |st|. This implies the equality
l˜1:t = l1:t + Vt for expected cumulative gains. The analogous equalities hold for
r˜t, r˜1:t and rt, r1:t.
The following theorem is a corollary of Theorem 2.
2 A modified version of Lemma 1 looks as follows: Let δ, δ′ be positive real numbers
such that δ′ > δ, and let for any two experts with bounded one-step gains (31) holds
for all sufficiently large t. Then for any number s˜1 a number s1 > 0 exists such that
s1 ≥ s˜1 and P{I = 1} ≥ 1− δ′, where P{I = 1} = f(s1,−s1).
Theorem 6. For any µ such that 0 < µ < 1 an FPL algorithm can be specified
such that for any non-degenerate game of two experts its expected cumulative
gain at any step T has the lower bound
l1:T ≥ e
− 2
µ (1− µ)|s11:T | − VT (1− e
− 2
µ (1− µ)), (33)
where s11:T is the cumulative gain of the the first expert and VT is the volume of
the game at step T .
If Dev(G) ≤ 12µδ for some 0 < δ < 1 then
l1:T ≥ (1− δ)(1 − µ)|s
1
1:T | − (δ + µ)VT (34)
holds for all sufficiently large T .
Proof. This theorem follows from Theorem 2 and relations between one-step
gains s˜it and s
i
t, i = 1, 2, of two type of experts. △
Remark. In case when Dev(G) ≤ 14µδ, the bound (34) can be improved for
some t if we replace in Section 3 the learning rate (7) on
ǫt−1 =
1
µmax
j<t
|s11:j |
.
Then the inequality (34) can be obtained directly (without using the modified
experts) from inequalities (22) and (23). We can prove that for any T such that
T = argmax
t≤T
|s11:t|
l1:T ≥ (1− δ)(1 − µ)|s
1
1:T |.
A Learning the fractional Brownian motion
In this section we present some example of the zero sum game studied in Sec-
tion 4. Rogers [8], Delbaen and Schachermayer [2], and Cheredito [3] have con-
structed arbitrage strategies for a financial market that consists of money market
account and a stock whose price follows a fractional Brownian motion (for con-
tinuous time) with drift or an exponential fractional Brownian motion with drift.
Vovk [9] has reformulated these strategies for discrete time.
Let S0, S1, . . . , Sn, . . . be a sequences of prices of some financial instruments
such as stocks or bonds. We consider the following “financial” game between an
investor and the market. The investor can use the long and short selling.
FOR t = 1, 2, . . . T − 1
At the beginning of trading period the investor’s cumulative income (or loss)
earned from the beginning of the game is s1:t−1 =
∑t−1
i=1 si.
At the beginning of trading period, observing his past incomes and losses the
investor determines the number Ct of shares of the stock needed to realize his
strategy.
At the end of trading period the market discloses the price St+1 of the stock,
and the investor incur his current income or loss at the period t 3
st = Ct(St+1 − St).
ENDFOR
Denote ∆St = St+1 − St. We have the following equality
(ST − S0)
2 = (
T−1∑
t=0
∆St)
2 =
T−1∑
t=0
2(St − S0)∆St +
T−1∑
t=0
(∆St)
2. (35)
The equality (35) leads to the two strategies which are represented by two
experts: At the beginning of step t Expert 1 holds the number of shares
C1t = 2C(St − S0), (36)
Expert 2 holds the number of shares
C2t = −2C(St − S0), (37)
where C is an arbitrary positive constant.
These strategies at step t earn the incomes s1t = 2C(St − S0)∆St and s
2
t =
−s1t . The strategy (36) earns in T steps of the game the income s
1
1:T = 2C((ST −
S0)
2−
T−1∑
t=1
(∆St)
2). The strategy (37) earns in T steps the income s21:T = −s
1
1:T .
The number of shares C1t = 2C(St−1 − S0) in the strategy (36) or number
of shares C2t = −2C(St−1−S0) in the strategy (37) can be positive or negative.
Expert 1 uses the hypothesis that the Hurst exponent of the price of stock is
> 12 (a smoother trend). Expert 2 uses the hypothesis that the Hurst exponent
is < 12 (volatility is high).
It is reasonable to derandomize the FPL algorithm for this financial game.
For that, the investor must follow both experts strategies simultaneously holding
P{I = 1}C1t +P{I = 2}C
2
t shares of a stock at any step t. In this case Theorem 6
holds, where the expected gain at step t is replaced on a pure gain st = P{I =
1}C1t∆St + P{I = 2}C
2
t∆St.
4
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